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Introduction'
The problem of land degradation, soil erosion and soil conservation is frequently analysed through optimal control models, since the choice is inherently a dynamic one, involving both intertemporal and mtratemporal trade-offs. Two important policy questions are how do changes in prices and discount rates affect the incentives for soil conservation2. Barrett (1991) applies a model first presented by McConnel (1983) to analyse such issues, in which the soil loss rate depends directly only on cultivation intensity.
More general models are provided by Barbier (1990) , LaFrance (1992) and Barrett (1995) all focusing on soil conservation measures. In addition, each analysis considers additional variables which are assumed to affect land degradation and soil erosion. Barbier (1990) and Barrett (1995) focus on the problem of soil erosion, and the stock variable in their studies is defined as soil depth. Barbier (1990) considers two control variables: first, a productive input package (productive inputs, labour, crop varieties and cropping practices) which is assumed to increase both output and soil loss and secondly, a soil conservation package assumed to reduce soil loss. Barrett (1995) considers three control variables: cultivation intensity, conservation inputs, and non-soil inputs.
Here, a higher intensity of cultivation increases both output and soil loss, while conservation inputs reduce soil loss. Non-soil inputs increase output but have no direct effect on soil loss. LaFrance (1992) focuses on the problem of land degradation where the stock variable represents soil fertility and can be interpreted as an index of several soil charachteristics as e.g. infiltration rate, content of organic matter, structure, nutrient content and soil depth. LaFrance (1992) considers crop increasing/land degrading inputs (fertilizer, irrigation, ploughing) and soil conserving/crop reducing inputs3.
A common feature in all models is that soil conservation efforts are assumed to be effective only in the time period they are implemented. In order for such measures to have lasting effects, the actual activity has to be repeated every crop season. Some conservation activities may well be described as time-limited with respect to their effectiveness, but most soil conservation measures have beneficial consequences beyond the current period. The implementation of structura conservation measures may be viewed as investments in land, since structures will have an anticipated life well beyound that of the present crop (Blailcie and Br000kfield, 1987). These structural measures involve constructions such as terraces, bundles, ditches, stone walls, windbreaks and drainage systems which dampen the soil loss rate and may increase the productivity of land through higher infiltration rates and a more stable supply of water.
Measures of this kind are frequently applied both in developed and less developed agriculture. In some regions such techniques have been a part of traditional agriculture, where farmers have adapted to the environment by terracing and constructing drainage channels. In other regions, the implemetation of structures has occurred in response to international and national agencies targeting soil conservation packages on more erosion-prone areas in many developing countries.
I am grateful to J.T LaFrance and A. Seierstead for helpful discussions. I also thank J. Strand, K. Alfsen and P.F. 2 See Barrett (1995) for an explanation of how macroeconomic and sectoral policies affect prices and discount rates. This paper analyses the role and implications of soil conservation measures with lasting effects on output.
Because of their durability, structures are treated as capital goods and attention is paid to the dynamics of soil-conserving capital. A partial micro economic analysis is conducted in order to study how the soil conservation decisions of land managers with perfect foresight respond to unanticipated permanent changes in prices and the discount rate. The analysis is confined to long-run influences of policy on the optimal soil conservation decision, and hence the analysis focuses on steady state. The analysis addresses neither income effects nor the effect of changes in agricultural output prices on the dicount rate.
Furthermore, this paper deals only with peasants who cultivate their own land, and no land-leasing contracts are considered5.
Section 2 introduces the investment model of soil conservation. Here, the optimality conditions are derived together with a presentation of both the user cost and the shadow price of structures. In section 3 the long-term effects of changes in output price and the discount rate on the soil base are analyzed.
Concluding remarks complete this investigation.
An investment model of soil conservation
The land degradation model presented below draws on the work of LaFrance (1992). The conservation inputs of this model are here replaced by conservation capital, while the modeling of productive inputs remains unchanged. The soil dynamics is described by the following equation,
where M is a constant representing the natural rate of soil regeneration. Zt is a vector of productive inputs, and IC, is the stock of conservation structures. Productive inputs degrade the soil, the larger the stock of structures (Kt) the lower the soil and fertility losses6.
The structure dynamics is as follows,
As in neo-classical investment theory, the change in stock of structures depends on the investment rate (It) less the depreciation of the structures. Structures are assumed to depreciate at a constant geometric rate (8) (replacement investments are a fixed proportion of existing capital stock). In addition to soil fertility (S) and productive inputs (Zr), the stock of structures (K) is also introduced as an argument in the production function, and is intended to represent the net result of two contradicting effects. The structures themselves take up permanently some productive land, depending on slope and gradient, this may cause reductions in output. Furthermore, there is an indirect effect of structures besides arresting soil and fertility losses in that land productivity may rise due to both a more stable supply of water and an improved infiltration rate which allows water to soak deeper into the ground. As a consequence, the immediate net effect of the stock of structures in production may go either way8. Output is then given by the production function, F(S"Zt,IC).
Let P denote the fixed price of the farm output and r the rate of discount. The land manager's problem for a given area of land then becomes (time references will in the following be omitted for notational convenience)9
Max f -1 0[PF(S,Z,K)-R(Z)-C(1)]e -"ilt
(3) o 7 The assumption of a convex cost function is necessary both to avoid an all-or-nothing investment policy and to fulfill the conditions for an optimal solution in this problem (see App.1). However, in many situations it is reasonable to believe that implementation costs increase in the rate of investment. Costs associated with replacement investments are assumed to be rather low, while structure-expanding investments involve much more resources (net investment). Such investments are labour intensive and may necessitate hiring of labour and the purchase of tools. Initiation of large-scale projects may also necessitate additional costs of mobilising, organising and monitoring the labour force which implements the structures.
8 Lutz, Pagiola and Reiche (1994) find that the construction of structures reduces the effective areas by 10 to 15 percent.
White and Jickling (1992), on a study on Haiti, report that infertile subsoil is brought to the surface during construction of structures resulting in production declines. 9 The problem presented in LaFrance (1992) is as follows: where subscripts denote partial derivatives throughout the paper e.g. F s am,z,Kyas. There are diminishing returns to soil fertility, productive inputs, and the stock of structures. More soil increases the marginal productivity of productive inputs. The soil fertility rate, G(Z,K), is assumed to be convex in both productive inputs and stock of structures. This implies that the marginal increase in fertility loss due to additional use of productive inputs is highest or (unchanged) for high productive input levels. The marginal reduction in soil fertility loss due to an increase in the stock of structures is highest for low initial levels of structures. The cross partial derivative of the soil loss function will be discussed later.
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The current value Hamiltonian associated with the problem is":
H = Ao[PF(S,Z,K) -R(Z) -C(1)] + l(M -G(Z,K)) + ii(I -8K) (5)
Assuming interior solutions, the sufficient conditions for an optimal solution are (see App.1 for further details);
-rA = -PFs(S,Z,K)
Eq.(6) describes the optimal investment rate by balancing short-term costs against long-term benefits. Along the optimal investment path (optimal pattern of structure accumulation) the marginal cost reduction associated with a lower investment rate must equal the shadow value of structures. The assumption of a convex cost function forces the farmer to pay attention to the future, as too rapid accumulation of structures will be costly. Eq.(7) states that the marginal costs and marginal benefits of additional use of productive inputs must be equal at optimum. The marginal cost is defined as the marginal increase in cultivation costs plus the (shadow) value of the soil lost due to that increase, while the marginal benefit is the profit obtained from a marginal increase in the use of productive inputs. Eqs.(8) and (9) determine the adjustment in the shadow values 7 and g along the optimal paths.
Expressions for the shadow values may be derived from the above conditions. Solving (8) yields the following expression for the current value multiplier (X) CO
A(t) = et f[PFs(S(r),Z(T),K(T))e -"kk
(10)
The shadow value of soil (2) at optimum equals the change in income caused by a marginal reduction in soil depth at time t for all future periods. Solving (9) yields the following expression for the shadow value of structures (g);
CO
= -e ("6)t f[A,GK(Z,,,K,)
The shadow value of structures is equal to the change in net income caused by a marginal reduction in the stock of structures at time t for all future periods, and consists of two terms. The first term of the integral is the change in the marginal soil loss rate multiplied by the current shadow value of soil, which together yield an expression for the income loss caused by a marginal reduction in K at time t due to a lower soil fertility. The second term is the loss or gain of immediate production from having a lower stock of structures. Taking the integral of the two terms implies that both losses and gains are considered for every future time period.
Comparing this model with the model of LaFrance (1992) has some interesting implications. The optimal soil conservation decision, the balancing of short-term costs against long-term benefits, differs across the two models. In LaFrance (1992), conservation inputs are employed until their marginal cost (unit cost) equals their marginal benefit, where the marginal benefit is defined as the gain associated with a higher stock of soil measured by the shadow price of land. In the investment model, by contrast, the marginal benefit associated with devoting more resources to soil conservation (investing in structures) is measured by the shadow price of structures [see (6)]. The marginal gains associated with soil conservation are no longer fully and solely reflected in the shadow price of soil, owing to the durability of soil conserving capita112. As with time-limited conservation inputs, an increase in the amount of resources devoted to soil conservation at time t will reduce the loss in soil fertility in all subsequent periods. In addition, the capital formation of structures will have effects on the rate of fertility loss beyond the period of time they are implemented; there will be a prevalent effect on future soil fertility until the increment in the stock of soil conserving capital is depreciated.
In the literature soil conservation has been viewed as investments along the lines of depletion theory, through absistence from depleting a resource. Investments in this sense involve a sacrifice of current production, but leave more for future consumption. When soil conservation measures are considered to have a life beyond that of the present crop, an additional dimension of conservation measures is introduced more in line with standard investment theory, as the formation of capital in order to produce a future stream of goods at the expense of current consumption or production. Devoting more resources to soil conserving capital entails both the formation of structures (capital) and the prevention of the depreciation of the soil asset.
The effect of changes in output price and discount rate
To study the long-term impacts of policy reforms on the optimal soil conservation decision, shifts in both the discount rate and the output price are considered in steady state. Steady state equilibrium is attained when =11 =,1=k=o.
Letting tildes denote steady-state values, and imposing the stationarity conditions (12) on (6)-(9) implies cx.i)
Rz(2) "ii,Gz(2k) = pFz0,24
PFs(Š,i,t) (8')
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Equations (6') -(9') can be readily combined to derive the following steady-state optimality conditions:
PF G K(2,IZ) C1(1)(r 8) = PF(SAI?) (13)
R(Z)
GOA) pF
PFz(W) (14) r
The expression on the left-hand side of (13) may be viewed as the user cost of structures, where the investment costs are adjusted for discounting and depreciation, represented by r and 8, respectively. It is seen that the agricultural output price affects this optimality condition through the shadow value of soil [X(T)} and through the effect of structures on immediate production [F K(S,K)]. A higher discount rate also affects the same condition in two ways. One effect reduces the shadow price of soil, thus making soil conservation less attractive on the margin. This effect is the same as in Barbier (1990), LaFrance (1992), and Barrett (1995). The other effect, however, is new. Here, the user cost of structures increases as a result of a higher discount rate. This effect will also weaken the incentives for investing in soil conservation measures.
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To analyse long-term consequences of permanent changes in output price and discount rate on soil fertlity, (1), (2), (13) and (14) evaluated in steady state are differentiated with respect to S, Z, K, P, and r. The following expression is derived for the impact of a change in the output price, where D>0 is shown to be required for a saddle point equilibrium (see Appendix 1 for further details). We have identified two contradicting direct effects on soil fertility for each of the two input groups in the model. The fundamenta reason for the different direction of change on the soil conservation incentives for the two input groups is the different implications soil conservation has on input costs. To reduce soil 13 Barrett (1995) introduces a third control variable, non-soil inputs, which increase production when supplied in larger quantities, but have no direct effect on soil erosion. A change in the output price will result in adjustments also in optimal input levels for such inputs, which again have consequences for the optimal choice of cultivation intensity and conservation inputs. Hence, additional effects on the optimal soil conservation decision are introduced by such a specification of the model. fertility rates by the build-up of conservation capital more resources are needed. To reduce the fertility loss by less use of productive inputs, less resources need to be devoted to this activity.
The effect of a higher discount rate on the steady state soil stock is as follows:
, dr Hz2,Cfie ?1 + i'12 + 13) However, an increase in the discount rate does not unequivocally reduce steady-state soil fertility in the full model. The reason is that a general model introduces additional (indirect) effects arising from both the fertility loss function and the production function, not present when analysing each input group separately. This result also coincides with that of Barrett (1995). Barbier (1990) and LaFrance (1992), on the other hand, find that the direction of change will in general be unambiguous, as more myopic households will keep a lower long-term stock of the soil resource, the higher the discount rate is. Their results, however, arise from different assumptions on technology 14. Barbier assumes a positive cross partial derivative of the soil loss function, implying that an increase in conservation inputs increases soil loss attributable to an increase in productive inputs. "Barbier makes this assumption upon observing that farmers often adopt soil conservation measures only after they switch to producing more erosive (and valuable crops) [Barrett, 1995, p.14]". Barrett (1994) and LaFrance (1992) make a more appealing assumption, namely that conservation mitigates the soil loss effect (soil degrading effects) of cultivation (productive inputs).
Sufficient conditions for the discount rate to weaken the incentives for soil conservation in the investment model are: FsK.?..0 and HzePFzic-XGrK <0, with both y2 and y3 becoming positive. GzK <0 is not a sufficient condition for a lower steady-state soil fertility in response to a higher discount rate in the investment model. Even if Gm >0, additional assumptions on changes in the marginal productivities of 14 LaFrance's conclusion follows from his assumptions on the current value Hamiltonian function (H 0). both soil and productive inputs from more conservation capital are needed, to reach a unique conclusion15. Hence, a higher discount rate can in principle both improve or worsen the incentives for soil conservation. The conclusion in Barrett (1995) remains true despite the additional negative effect on soil fertility identified in the investment model, which arises from a higher discount rate through the user cost of structures.
Although the effect of discount rate changes on soil conservation could go either way, smooth functional forms will in general yield a negative effect. It is then reasonable to expect that higher discount rates in general will dampen the incentives for soil conservation. One important condition for arriving at a different conclusion is that the marginal fertility loss due to more intensive cultivation is strongly reduced with the accumulation of structures .
Conclusion
The main result of this analysis concerns the treatment of soil conservation methods as an investment in land. In the literature so far, erosion-preventing inputs and soil conservation practices have been analyzed within a framework where they are assumed to be time-limited with respect to their effectiveness in arresting soil erosion and soil depletion. However, many of the important methods for conserving the soil have effects beyond the current crop season. As a consequence, the investment decision for a farmer becomes more than just a reduction in the actual soil loss rate during an interval of time, which in turn keeps soil depth higher over a longer term. Investment in soil conservation measures is also the build-up of soil conserving capital which mitigates the degradation of land over a longer period of time. For such conserving measures the shadow value of structures (or the user cost of structures) describes the optimal soil conservation decision.
The investment model studied in this paper introduces both a different optimality condition for soil conservation and some new effects of changes in prices and discount rates on the optimal steady-state soil stock compared to previous models. However, analysing soil conservation as an investment in land will not contradict the main conclusions arrived at in other models on land degradation and soil erosion. In order to predict the outcome of the optimal soil conservation decision, detailed information is needed on input use, the actual soil conservation measures applied and production technology.
The results from this study are not surprising considering the similarity in structure between conservation inputs and conservation structures. The investment model approaches the model of LaFrance (1992) as the rate of depreciation goes to one, entailing that structures have no effect beyond the period of time in which they are implemented. The fundamental cause for the opposite direct effects of price changes across the two input groups on optimal soil conservation is found in the way inputs costs are connected to the endeavors of reducing fertility losses. For both conservation inputs and structures more resources are needed to combat fertility losses. For productive inputs, however, the effect is opposite. Here, less input use is needed to reduce soil mining.
The total effect of changes in the discount rate on the optimal soil conservation decision is also in principle ambiguous. An additional negative effect on soil depth from increases in the discount rate is identified when analysing soil conserving capital rather than conservation inputs. However, the presence of this effect is not sufficient for predicting that a rise in the discount rate will unambiguously lower the equilibrium soil depth.
The model considered assumes that farming practices, conservation methods and inputs can be classified as either crop increasing/land degrading or crop reducing/land improving. This need not always be the case. The net effect from some inputs may be beneficial both for the resource base and immediate output. One example could be chemical fertilizers. The application of fertilizers will provide land with a denser vegetation providing a better protection of soils, thereby preventing water run-off. In some cases this effect could offset the land degrading effects arising from the use of the same input (acidification). Another example is organic fertilizers such as dung and crop residues, which improve soil fertility by supplying organic matter and nutrients to the soil and at the same time protect land cover from erratic onsets from wind and rain. The introduction of such crop increasing/land improving inputs could well be analyzed within our model. As mentioned above, the partial effect of an increase in the output price will depend on the way in which input costs are connected to actions implemented for reducing fertility losses. As is the case for crop reducing/land improving inputs, additional input use is needed to reduce the degradation of soils for crop increasing/land improving inputs. Thus, the partial effect of a higher output price on steady-state soil fertility will be positive for such inputs. I is defined from (6) and will maximise H since C(I) is strictly convex. Z is defined from (7) and maximises H since H is strictly concave in Z. A sufficient condition for A.1.2. is that H is concave in (S,K,I,Z).
Sufficient and necessary conditions for a local saddle point equilibrium for problem (3) Substituting for I from (6) and for Z from (7), the dynamic evolution of the system along an optimal path can be expressed by (1), (2), (8) 
